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COMMENTS ON THE ARTICLES OF 
PROFESSORS BAIRD AND JANGER  
BROOKLYN SYMPOSIUM ON BANKRUPTCY 
CLAIMS TRADING AND SECURITIES 
REGULATION 
Allan L. Gropper* 
Professors Douglas G. Baird and Edward J. Janger have clearly and 
concisely spelled out why we need regulation of what Professor Baird calls 
“The Bankruptcy Exchange.”1 However, that is not necessarily to agree 
with Professor Baird’s contention that the bankruptcy judge has 
“established” the exchange in the same fashion that a medieval prince 
would organize a trade fair or that a group of merchants formed the Chicago 
Board of Trade.2 Nevertheless, today’s bankruptcy judge functions in an 
arena where claims trade constantly. 
As Professor Baird demonstrates, not only do the bankruptcy judge’s 
decisions affect the trades, but the trades can affect the judge’s decisions as 
well.3 The concept that a judge’s decision in a case may affect the value of a 
claim is obvious. Although not as obvious, it is also true that trades may 
affect a judge’s decision. For example, in a recent case involving the 
valuation of a debtor for fraudulent conveyance purposes, the Third Circuit 
held that the value of a company’s stock in a market free of manipulation is 
virtually conclusive as to the solvency or insolvency of the enterprise.4 
Many other cases, including two of my own, have found that the value 
placed on an enterprise by a potential acquirer is highly probative when 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Allan L. Gropper is a United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of New 
York. These comments were presented at a symposium on securities regulation and claims trading 
organized by the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law on February 27, 
2009. 
 1. Douglas G. Baird, The Bankruptcy Exchange, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 23 (2009). 
(according to Baird, the Bankruptcy Exchange is the trading of claims against a debtor in 
bankruptcy proceedings); see also Edward J. Janger, The Costs of Liquidity Enhancement: 
Transparency Costs, Risk Alteration and Coordination Problems, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 39 
(2009). 
 2. Baird, supra note 1, at 24.  
 3. Id.  
 4. VFB L.L.C. v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624, 632–33 (3d Cir. 2007) (also called the 
“Vlasic Pickle case” as it involved the spinoff of that business). There, the court held that 
“[a]bsent some reason to distrust it, the market price is ‘a more reliable measure of the stock’s 
value than the subjective estimates of one or two expert witnesses.’” Id. at 633 (quoting In re 
Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 320 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Statutory Comm. v. Motorola, Inc. (In re 
Iridium Operating L.L.C.), 373  B.R. 283, 293 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (the court stated that the 
public trading market “remains the best and most unbiased measure of fair market value and, 
when available to the Court, is the preferred standard of valuation”). 
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judging the opinions of competing expert witnesses.5 Professor Baird sums 
up the dangers of relying solely on trades in valuation disputes with the 
quip: “If the judge follows the market price at the same time those who 
trade in the market are following the judge, they will simply be chasing 
each other’s tails.”6 This is a good point to recall in the difficult area of 
valuation. 
In any event, both Professors Baird and Janger convincingly 
demonstrate the importance of subjecting claims trading to some form of 
regulation. In particular, Professor Janger shows that liquidity enhancement 
has been overvalued in the bankruptcy context.7 Both professors correctly 
emphasize the importance and centrality of disclosure in any regulatory 
scheme. The bankruptcy judge is frequently asked to make decisions based 
on the views of the parties before him. Thus, when deciding whether to 
approve a compromise, the judge is directed to consider, among other 
things, “the paramount interest of the creditors and a proper deference to 
their reasonable views in the premises.”8 This is not to argue that we should 
simply accept the hue and cry of the majority, but as Professor Baird 
contends, we need to know who the creditors are.9 Trading in claims and 
fragmentation of interests make it particularly hard to determine who owns 
what and whose position should be accorded weight. 
If we accept the need for regulation of this large and active market, two 
pressing questions present themselves: what type of a regulatory structure is 
required and what is its scope? Unfortunately, neither professor has 
answered that question; nor did any of the other participants in the 
Symposium. In light of the present administration’s determination to 
regulate so-called “exotic securities,” the need for an answer has become 
even more compelling in the months since the Symposium took place.10 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See In re Granite Broad. Corp, 369 B.R. 120, 140–41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re 
Oneida, Ltd., 351 B.R. 79, 93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 6. Baird, supra note 1, at 27.  
 7. For example, he cogently examines the decision of the District Court in the Enron case 
holding that in the name of liquidity enhancement, equitable subordination defenses do not run 
with the claim where the claim is “assigned.” See Janger, supra note 1, at 55–56 (discussing Enron 
Corp. v. Springfield Assoc. (In re Enron Corp.), 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), vacating, 340 
B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)). In order to extend the principle of liquidity enhancement, the 
court’s decision in Enron created a distinction between a sale and an assignment that has no basis 
in any law, including the Uniform Commercial Code, which does not distinguish between a sale 
and an assignment. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. LAW §§ 1-201(32), 9-408 (McKinney 2001); see also 
N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-404(a) (McKinney 2001); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-105 (McKinney 
1963). 
 8. See, e.g., Wallis v. Justice Oaks II Ltd. (In re Justice Oaks II, Ltd.), 898 F.2d 1544, 1549 
(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Martin v. Kane (In re A & C Properties), 784 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854 (1986) (quoting In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 730 F.2d 
1128, 1135 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985)). 
 9. Baird, supra note 1. 
 10. See, e.g., David Cho & Zachary A. Goldfarb, U.S. Pushes Ahead With Derivatives 
Regulation; First in Broad Overhaul: Rules on ‘Dark Markets’ That Fueled Meltdown, WASH. 
POST,  May 14, 2009, at A1 (“The Obama Administration yesterday unveiled a plan to regulate a 
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Derivatives and credit default swaps are usually included in the list of 
securities or instruments to be regulated, but there is no evidence to date 
that bankruptcy claims are on the agenda of the putative regulators. 
In considering the kind of regulation and disclosure needed to make the 
bankruptcy process work properly, we must take account of the fact that we 
are writing on a fundamentally blank slate. There is virtually no regulation 
of the market for trading in bankruptcy claims at present, except for a few 
disclosure obligations discussed below. However, it is important to 
recognize that we have reached this point not because of a conscious 
decision to leave the market unregulated, but due to the absence of any 
decision. 
There are many reasons why bankruptcy claims trading remains largely 
unregulated. While claims trading is as old as our nation,11 the explosion of 
claims trading that has taken place in recent years is unprecedented. 
Professor Baird suggests that the current market is in “the hundreds of 
billions of dollars.”12 
There is also very little regulation in this area because the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978,13 for unknown reasons, omitted the provisions of §§ 
21214 and 24915 of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898,16 as well as former 
Bankruptcy Rules 10-21117 and 10-215(c)(4),18 which modified and 
supplemented them.19 Thereafter, the only rule that survived under the 
Bankruptcy Code, and that was construed as a substantive regulation of 
claims trading, was Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e).20 As adopted in 1983, 
Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) left some room for the bankruptcy court to review 
                                                                                                                 
vast market of exotic financial instruments known as derivatives, which fueled the global 
economic crisis and wounded some of the biggest names on Wall Street.”); see also Edmund L. 
Andrews & Louise Story, U.S. to Detail Plan to Rein in Finance World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 
2009, at A1; Zachary A. Goldfarb, Geithner Pushes Derivatives Plan; But He Warns Europe May 
Not Follow, WASH. POST, July 11, 2009 at A10. 
 11. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of 
Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1990) (describing the trading of debt 
instruments issued by the states during and after the American Revolution). 
 12. Baird, supra note 1, at 23 n.1 (quoting Adam J. Levitin, Jr., Finding Nemo: Rediscovering 
the Virtues of Negotiability in the Wake of Enron, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 83, 86 (2007). 
 13. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 14. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 212, 30 Stat. 544 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 612 (1976)) (repealed 
1978). 
 15. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 249, 30 Stat. 544 (codified at 11 U.S.C § 649. (1976)) (repealed 
1978). 
 16. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
 17. FED. R. BANKR. P. 10-211 (1973) (repealed 1978). 
 18. FED. R. BANKR. P. Bank R. 10-215(c)(4) (repealed 1983). 
 19. Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 11, at 27–28. These provisions dealt principally with 
trading in claims by fiduciaries. Id. 
 20. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) (1991). 
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the circumstances of the transfer of a claim.21 Originally, Bankruptcy Rule 
3001(e) required that evidence of a claim transfer, together with evidence of 
the terms of the transfer, had to be filed with the bankruptcy court.22 The 
Rule also stated that “[i]f the court finds, after a hearing on notice, that the 
claim has been unconditionally transferred, it shall enter an order 
substituting the transferee for the original claimant, otherwise the court 
shall enter such order as may be appropriate.”23 
This Rule was largely ministerial. The filing of the required information 
with respect to the transfer disclosed the identity of the holder of the claim 
and the consideration paid. It also made clear the identity of the creditor for 
the purposes of voting and distribution.24 However, the Advisory 
Committee Note to the Rule indicated that some degree of court oversight 
was intended, when it stated: 
The interests of sound administration are served by requiring the post-
petition transferee to file with the proof of claim a statement of the 
transferor acknowledging the transfer and the consideration for the 
transfer. Such a disclosure will assist the court in dealing with the evils 
that may arise out of post-bankruptcy traffic in claims against an estate.25 
After the adoption of the amended Rule in 1983, decisions began to 
deal with the perceived “evils” of this “traffic”26 by entities that were not 
insiders or fiduciaries. One of the first cases was In re Revere Copper and 
Brass, Inc., where a trader had purchased claims at 20 cents on the dollar 
near the time the debtor publicly announced its intention to propose a plan 
that would pay 65 cents in cash.27 Although there were no objections to the 
notices of claims’ transfer under former Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2), the 
court refused to grant routine approval to the transfers and required that the 
creditors be given more information and the right to rescind their sales.28  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) (1983) (amended 1991) (the 1983 version of the Rule was 
adapted from Bankruptcy Rules 301 and 302 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). 
 22. Id. The Rule excepted claims “based on a publicly traded note, bond or debenture” and 
thus preserved the unimpeded transferability of these securities. Id. The Rule also set out different 
procedures for the transfer of claims for security and the transfer of claims before and after a proof 
of claim had been filed in court. See id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. advisory committee’s note. The Advisory Committee Note cited several cases that 
illustrated such “evils,” all of which involved a breach of fiduciary duty by insiders or fiduciaries, 
including: In re Phila. & W. Ry. Co., 64 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Monroe v. Scofield (In re 
Gallic-Vulcan Mining Corp.), 135 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1943); cf. In re Latham Lithographic Corp., 
107 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 26. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) advisory committee’s note (1983) (amended 1991). 
 27. In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 28. Id. 
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Echoing the Advisory Committee Note to Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e)(2), the 
court wrote: 
One of the evils attendant upon a solicitation of assignment of claims for a 
cash payment such as is being made by [the assignee] is that solicited 
creditors may be unaware of their rights and options and fall prey to the 
belief that bankruptcy inevitably will result in their receiving the 
proverbial 10 cents on the dollar or worse.29 
Another case that illustrated the developing law was In re Allegheny 
International, Inc.,30 where the court, faced with an active trading market 
and incomplete public information on the status of the case,31 “echo[ed] the 
concerns expressed in In re Revere Copper and Brass, Inc.” by imposing on 
the debtor “the duty of advising the potential assignor of the debtor’s 
estimate of the value of the claim. . . . until such time as a new plan of 
reorganization and disclosure statement are filed.”32 The court expressed its 
concerns stating: 
We do not believe that Congress intended the trafficking in claims such as 
has occurred in this case and others. Such concerns are evident from the 
1983 Advisory Committee Note, although we recognize that the cases 
cited therein involved breaches of fiduciary duty . . . . Although this case 
does not involve inside knowledge, it is colored with superior knowledge, 
and thus the assignments are similar to contracts of adhesion. We hope 
that Congress will address these concerns in the future.33 
Congress did not act to address these concerns positively. Rather, it 
responded to the Revere and Allegheny courts’ apparent concerns regarding 
the application of Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) by amending it to remove any 
disclosure requirement pertaining to the price at which a transfer was made 
and expressly “limit the court’s role to the adjudication of disputes 
regarding transfers of claims.”34 The language in the prior Advisory 
Committee note relating to the “evils that may arise out of post-bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 2. 
 30. In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 100 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 242–44. See also the court’s later decision in In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990). 
 33. In re Allegheny Int’l Inc., 100 B.R. at 243. In In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., involving the 
bankruptcy of Eastern Air Lines, the court found the Revere and Allegheny decisions inapposite, 
because the transferor and transferee were both sophisticated institutions with adequate 
information. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 119 B.R. 440, 446 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). The court 
canvassed the “evils” spawned by claims trading in large cases and expressed concern that the 
action of the parties there, in partially assigning claims, imposed on the debtors “the substantially 
increased burden associated with monitoring, administering and objecting to claims which have 
been filed against the estate.” Id. at 444. 
 34. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) advisory committee’s note (1991) (amending FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 3001(e) (1983)); see also Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 11, at 41–43. 
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traffic in claims”35 was deleted and effectively overridden by the new 
Advisory Committee Note which stated that amended Bankruptcy Rule 
3001(e) “is not intended either to encourage or discourage postpetition 
transfers of claims or to affect any remedies otherwise available under 
nonbankruptcy law to a transferor or transferee such as for 
misrepresentation in connection with the transfer of a claim.”36 In other 
words, the bankruptcy courts were told to keep out of the claims trading 
arena. Except in the few areas discussed below, and despite the enormous 
increase in bankruptcy claims trading since 1991, there have been no new 
decisions on the order of Revere or Allegheny. 
Although there is no official report of the deliberations of the Rules 
Committee that recommended the amendments to Bankruptcy Rule 
3001(e),37 it was suggested at the Symposium that the Committee may have 
viewed a ministerial rule like 3001(e) as being unable to deal with difficult 
and controversial policy issues, such as what a judge’s role should be in 
connection with the transfer of claims and what should be disclosed.38 The 
Rules Committee may have viewed the issues as appropriate for 
consideration by Congress, or perhaps the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Such a view is consistent with the express hope of the Allegheny 
court that Congress would deal with the issue.39 Nevertheless, after 1991, 
neither Congress, the SEC, nor any other group took up the task of 
addressing the issues of the judge’s role and the scope of appropriate 
disclosure concerning claims trading. The period from 1991 until 2008 was 
not conducive to the promotion of regulation in any sphere. As a result, 
there is virtually no regulation governing the market for bankruptcy claims. 
This is not to say that there is no involvement at all by the bankruptcy 
courts that bears on some of the claims trading issues raised by Professors 
Baird and Janger. However, with the exception indicated below, most of the 
courts’ involvement has dealt with the effects of claims trading.40 The 
questions presented in such a situation often turn on whether a creditor has 
economic interests that are adverse to the class in which it votes.41 
                                                                                                                 
 35. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) advisory committee’s note (1983) (amended 1991). 
 36. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) advisory committee’s note (1991) (amending FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 3001(e) (1983)) (emphasis added). 
 37. The amendments became effective in 1991. 
 38. Remarks at the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law & the 
Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of International Business Law Symposium: Bankruptcy 
Claims Trading and Securities Regulation (Feb. 27, 2009). 
 39. See In re Allegheny Int’l Inc, 100 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988). 
 40. For example, the Bankruptcy Code provides that the court may, after notice and a hearing, 
invalidate the vote of “any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith, 
or was not solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of” the 
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §1126(e) (2006). 
 41. Some of the issues arising out of extensive trading in distressed debt are discussed in In re 
Adelphia Commc’n Corp., 359 B.R. 54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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The sole exception to the absence of any regulation or rule-making is 
Bankruptcy Rule 2019.42 The rule originated in the 1930’s and in its current 
form requires the disclosure of certain information from informal or ad hoc 
committees of creditors.43 Until the decisions in the Northwest Airlines case 
in 2007, Rule 2019 was rarely enforced.44 The claims trading community 
responded negatively to the Northwest decisions, and it urged the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States to eliminate the Rule altogether.45 However, in July 
2009, the Committee instead recommended the adoption of a revised Rule 
2019 that preserves the principle of disclosure while meeting some of the 
traders’ principal concerns.46 While the current proposed revision deletes 
some of the required disclosures, it also strengthens the Rule by making it 
applicable to both official and unofficial creditor committees.47 As of 
August 2009, the revised rule has been published for public comment.48 The 
proposed amendments to Rule 2019 are a useful reference point as we 
approach the issue of regulation. 
There was never a conscious decision that the enormous market in 
bankruptcy claims should not be regulated. In my opinion, it should be. 
Along with Professors Baird and Janger, the other participants in the 
Symposium have ably started the dialogue on this important issue. It is time 
that Congress turned its attention to it in a comprehensive fashion. 
                                                                                                                 
 42. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also In re 
Northwest Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). The decisions applied the 
disclosure requirements to an informal committee of security holders and refused to provide for 
the disclosure to be made under seal. In re Northwest Airlines, 363 B.R. 701; In re Northwest 
Airlines, 363 B.R. 704. (For full disclosure, these decisions were written by the author of this 
Comment). 
 45. See Letter from Ira Hammerman, Senior Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. & 
Fin. Markets Ass’n, to Peter G. McCabe, Comm. of Rule of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial 
Conference of the U.S. (Nov. 30, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
rules/BKSuggestions2007/07-BK-G-.pdf. 
 46. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019 (Proposed Amendments 2009), available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/rules/proposed0809/BK_Rules_Forms_Amendments.pdf. 
 47. Id. 
 48. U.S. Courts, Rules Published for Comment, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules1.htm 
(comments are due by Feb. 16, 2010). 
